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DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION OF BIDDERS ON
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES
PAUL H. GANTT* AND IRVING R. M. PANZER**
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1956 in a "pioneering"' article on "The Government Black-
list: Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government Contracts,"
we pointed out that no survey of the area had been made since the
1939 Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedures'
concluded that "the penalty of blacklisting is so severe that its im-
position may destroy a going business."
During 1961 and 1962 the Committee on Adjudication of Claims
of the Administrative Conference of the United States made an ex-
cellent survey.' Based thereon, the Conference included in its final
report to the President recommendations concerning procedural fair-
ness in the debarment of contractors, the grounds and scope of debar-
ment and debarment periods'
The report had no legal or operative effect of its own. It was
purely advisory, in line with the functions of the Administrative Con-
ference itself.
This paper, then, will concern itself with comments on the Ad-
ministrative Conference's findings and recommendations, with the
progress or lack of progress of implementation by executive agencies,
* Chairman, Board of Contract Appeals and Assistant Solicitor, Branch of Claims
and Contract Appeals, Department of the Interior; J.U.D. 1931, University of Vienna,
Austria; B.C.L. 1942, William and Mary; Admitted to the Bars of the District of
Columbia, Virginia, Court of Claims and Supreme Court of the United States.
** In private practice, Washington, D.C.; B.S. 1937, New York University; LL.B.
1940, Harvard University; Admitted to the Bars of the District of Columbia, New York,
Court of Claims and Supreme Court of the United States.
Opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.
1
 The Report of the Committee on Adjudication of Claims points out in its Com-
mittee Findings: "For pioneering surveys of government contractor debarment, highly
critical of government procedures and practices, see Miller, Administrative Discretion
in the Award of Federal Contracts, 53 Mich. L. Rev, 781 (1955) ; Gantt and Panzer,
The Government Blacklist: Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government Con-
tracts, 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 175 (1957)."
2 Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedures, Division of Public
Contracts 3 (1939) (mimeographed).
s "The Conference carried forward under the present administration the kind of
consideration of administrative law problems that had been undertaken originally by
the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure during the Eisenhower adminis-
tration." Fuchs, The Administrative Conference of the United States, 15 Adm. L. Rev. 6
(1963).
4 The relevant part of the report is entitled Recommendation No. 29.
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and with general observations on developments in the field of debar-
ment and suspension since 1956.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
A word first about the Administrative Conference of the United
States, now (unfortunately) defunct, although bills to revive it on a
continuing basis are pending in the Congress as of the date of this
writing (November 1963).
Since 1949 it had been suggested that an organization paralleling
the Judicial Conference of the United States—the success of which
was unquestioned—should be established for federal agencies just
as the Judicial Conference of the United States was created for federal
courts. Eventually the Administrative Conference was established,
not by the Congress as was the Judicial Conference,' but rather by the
President.°
The Conference consisted of a Council of eleven members (the
Chairman of which was Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, senior Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, and an acknowledged authority on improvement of adminis-
trative agency procedures) appointed by the President and comprised
of persons from government agencies, private practice and academic
life, all of whom were outstanding experts in administrative law.
In addition to the Council, seventy-five other persons became
members of the Conference by invitation or by appointment of federal
agencies. Forty-four of these persons were from the federal govern-
ment, including members of agencies, general counsel, and other high-
ranking staff officials; twenty-nine were from outside the government,
including private practitioners and professors; and two were hearing
examiners.
The Conference organized itself into committees, each dealing with
a different area of interest in the field of administrative procedure.
One of those committees, headed by Mr. Cyrus R. Vance (then general
counsel of the Department of Defense, now Secretary of the Army),
dealt with the "adjudication of claims," and it was this committee
which investigated and reported on the subject of debarment and sus-
pension of government contractors.
The purpose of the Administrative Conference, as set forth
in the executive order, was as follows
The purpose of the Conference shall be to assist the Presi-
dent, the Congress and the administrative agencies and
executive departments in improving existing administrative
procedures. To this end the Conference shall conduct studies
5 28 U.S.C. 	 331 (Supp. IV, 1959 -62).
6 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1299 (1961).
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of the efficiency, adequacy and fairness of procedures by
which Federal executive departments and administrative
agencies protect the public interest and determine the rights,
privileges and obligations of private persons. The Conference
shall from time to time report to the President any conclusions
reached by its members based on such studies, together with
suggestions for appropriate measures to improve the ad-
ministrative process. The Conference shall make a final re-
port to the President no later than December 31, 1962,
summarizing its activities, evaluating the need for further
studies of administrative procedures, and suggesting ap-
propriate means to be employed for this purpose in the
future.'
Unlike the Judicial Conference of the United States, which is a
permanent body, established by legislation, the Administrative Con-
ference was temporary and expired on December 31, 1962. Shortly
before it expired, the Conference made thirty recommendations to the
President in many fields of administrative law,
The work accomplished by the Conference was recognized as so
valuable, and the reasons for having a permanent, continuing Admin-
istrative Conference appeared so clear, that a number of bills were
introduced in Congress during early 1963 to establish a permanent
conference.
The Administration's bill, S. 1664, was passed by the Senate on
October 30, 1963 with no discussion and no dissent. The bill thus went
over to the House where an identical bill, H.R. 7200, and an American
Bar Association version, H.R. 7201, had languished without action of
any sort for many months. The bill reportedly will receive a chilly
reception on the House side, but in view of the unanimous (though
somewhat unexpected) Senate action there apparently is hope for
passage.
In purpose and in organization, the permanent Administrative
Conference contemplated by S. 1664 would be quite similar to the now-
defunct Conference. Under S. 1664, the Conference would be headed
by a full-time Chairman appointed for five years, and would be com-
posed of (1) the heads of the Federal regulatory agencies and executive
departments, (2) persons appointed by the President as members of
the eleven-member Council and (3) other persons, to be appointed by
the Chairman, who shall be "members of the practicing bar, scholars
in the field of administrative law or government, or others specially
informed by knowledge and experience with respect to Federal ad-
ministrative procedure."
7 Id. at 1299-1300.
8 The text of all recommendations appears in Fuchs, supra note 3, at 23-45.
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It is to be devoutly hoped that a permanent Administrative Con-
ference will be established.
III. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS ON
DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION
The Committee on Adjudication of Claims, headed by Mr. Cyrus
R. Vance and aided by an excellent research staff, launched a full-scale
investigation of the debarment and suspension procedures of all govern-
ment agencies related to contracting (procurement), including surplus
contracting. It was the most thorough research job ever done on the
actual facts of debarment and suspension by the federal government.
The inadequacy (or total absence) and inconsistency of procedures and
safeguards which the staff of the Committee found to be the case
paralleled the examples cited by the present authors in their previous
article on the same subject.° The Committee's written report, dated
October 1, 1962, is so important to both its factual findings and its
recommendations for procedural changes, that the report deserves to
be summarized here."
IV. FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE REPORT
The Committee found that some 340 business firms were barred -
from participating directly or indirectly in some or all government
procurement or surplus disposal contracts. About sixty of those firms
were also excluded from contracts for most federally assisted con-
struction work throughout the United States. "Except for a small
percentage," said the Report, "this government action is taken with-
out opportunity for an adversary hearing and if based on suspected
criminal conduct is generally without being officially notified or in-
formed of meaningful reasons, or opportunity to learn why."
The documentation of this statement is impressive. Only two
statutes, the Buy American Act" and the Davis-Bacon Act,' 2 expressly
require debarment of government contractors; a third statute, the
Walsh-Healy Act," expressly authorizes debarment. Aside from these
three statutes, authority for all government debarment and suspension
of contractors is generally implied from statutory provisions (applica-
ble to the bulk of government contracts) that contract awards are
9 Supra note 1.
19 Copies of the Report may be obtained from the Director, Office of Administrative
Procedure, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. The Report is printed at pp. 267-
295 of Selected Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States, S. Doc.
No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
11 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), 41 U.S.C. ** 10(a)-(d) (1958), as amended, 41 U.S.C.
** 10(c), (d) (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
12 74 Stat. 418 (1960), 40 U.S.C. 	 276a (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
18 49 Stat. 2037 (1936), 41 U.S.0 § 37 (1958).
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to be made to "responsible" bidders." None of these statutory pro-
visions contains a requirement that an adversary hearing be held,
and (as the Report noted) only a few of the administrative agency
regulations do. And even as to these latter, the Report states that
"[i]n practice, such hearings are rarely held." When the contractor is
a business firm suspected of fraud or other criminal conduct in govern-
ment dealings, and the Department of Justice is investigating the
case with a view to a possible criminal or civil action, the contractor
is "suspended" from receiving awards until the Department of
Justice determines whether to institute the action. Not only was no
advance notice to the contractor required before he was "suspended,"
but some regulations' 5
 actually prohibited the contractor's having an
opportunity to know the reasons or the evidence for the suspension.
The Report found that a third of the seventy-five contractors then
under suspension by the Department of Defense had been on the
suspended list for more than five years, presumably awaiting the day
when the government would decide, not the merits of their case, but
simply whether to institute proceedings.
In our prior article," we had been speaking of "blacklisting"
(which we considered synonymous with debarment) and "grey listing"
(which we considered synonymous with suspension). We thought that
the color scheme was complete. But the Report turned the spotlight
on another whole class of debarments or suspensions—the de facto and
even secret debarment or suspension, usually based upon an internal
agency list of contractors "considered" to be of questionable integrity
or responsibility." As the Report states: "For the most part these lists
are secret, and business firms are without notice, or meaningful op-
portunity to challenge, the fact of listing or the denial of contracts on
such grounds."
When the Committee attempted to ascertain the grounds and the
scope of debarments, it discovered a chaotic situation. Some grounds
14 E .g., 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1958) ; 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 253(b)
(1958). In their previous article, the authors intimated (but did not articulate) some
question whether the drastic sanction of debarment could be rested upon the one word
"responsible" in the statutory pronouncements and expressed the view that in any
event express legislative authority should exist before such sanctions are employed. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has since in Schlesinger v. Gates,
249 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 939 (1958), sustained a Navy
debarment on the authority of the "responsible bidder" concept (41 U.S.C. § 152(6),
now codified 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1958)). In Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the same court possibly put the matter to
rest when it sustained the debarment authority of the Department of Labor under
Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1267, 5 U.S.C. § 133z (1958).
15 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1.605-4 (1961), now obsolete.
15 Supra note 1.
17 Kulp, Greylisting in Government Procurement Practice (September 1962). This
paper was written as part of the Government Contracts Seminar of Professor John W.
Whelan of the Georgetown Law Center.
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were, of course, set forth in administrative regulations, such as con-
viction of fraud in government contracting, but many grounds were
nowhere set out or defined. Some regulations were so vague that
"generalized criteria have led to debarments on questionable grounds,
not reasonably related to government contracting, including the ex-
ercise of the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination."
Although debarment is customarily extended to the business affiliates
of the debarred entity, published regulations did not specify the criteria
for determining affiliation or for extending the debarment. Where fraud
by an owner, officer or employee of a business firm is established or
suspected—which might, of course, lead to debarment of the firm—
there were no published criteria by which that fraud might be im-
puted to the firm itself, or by which the termination of that person's
relationship to the firm might avoid or remove debarment of the firm.
In surveying the length of debarment periods, the Report found no
uniformity whatsoever among the various agencies, even for the same
act. )
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations provided "as a
general rule" that debarment should not exceed a five-year period
following a conviction for fraud or other criminal, offense' or a three-
year period for any other cause. The General Services Procurement
Regulations, on the other hand, provided that debarment "shall
generally be made for periods of not less than one and not more than
three years, depending on the seriousness of the offense.' And "sus-
pension" of contractors suspected of criminal, conduct, pending in-
vestigation and determination by the Department of Justice whether to
institute action, as mentioned earlier, can continue for an indefinite
period of years, exceeding the five-year period stated as the maximum
in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations.
No published procurement regulation provided, in express terms,
for removal of a debarment prior to the expiration of the debarment
period upon a showing of present responsibility of the contractor,
"nor," (says the Report) "is there a practice of such removal."20
18 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. 1.604-2 (Supp. 1963).
18 GSPR, 41 C.F.R. 	 5-1.605(b) (1963). Unlike- the Federal Procurement Regu-
lations (FPR), the GSPR apply only within the General Services Administration.
20 To illustrate the thin line between the "responsible bidder" concept and debar-
ment, we quote the rescission of a somewhat permanent disqualification of a bidder.
The contracting officer wrote:
On the basis of your performance for other agencies during the past year,
your increasing facilities for performance, and your assurance to us of your
willingness to prosecute any future work for . . . with diligence toward com-
pletion within specified contract time limits, I am today rescinding the action
of . . . [instructing other contracting officers to consider the firm as not
being a responsible bidder]. I am notifying each of our ... [contracting officers]
of this action and advising them that, in our opinion, you may henceforth
be considered a responsible bidder. However, inasmuch as authority is nor-
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As a final procedural note, the Report pointed out that, with one
exception (debarments under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act),
none of the three statutes and none of the regulations dealing with
debarment or suspension provided for separation of functions between
the persons who proposed such government action and the persons who
decided the matter. And, in fact, there was no such separation in prac-
tice. The same officials (in the military departments and in the De-
partment of Labor, to take the two examples cited in the Report) who
proposed debarment, supervised the investigation and made the final
decision as to debarment.
The mere statement of the above listed practices, when contrasted
with modern principles of administrative procedure, as expressed in
the Administrative Procedure Ace' and in the many, book-filling,
judicial decisions on other types of administrative action, 22
 obviously
left something to be desired.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM
The Report discussed above had previously, in much the same
form, been circulated throughout the federal government as a Staff
Report. The Staff Report also contained recommendations for re-
form or improvement, bearing in mind the competing considerations
of fairness to the contractor who may be put out of business, the
interest of the government in excluding the dishonest, the irresponsible
or the untrustworthy from its programs and the public interest in
assuring that the drastic sanction of debarment or suspension is
exercised fairly. After the detailed views of government departments
mally delegated .. . [to them] to make award of contract, such advice need
not be binding upon them if upon their own judgment of facts relating to
the situation they decide otherwise.
5 Gov't Contr. 418 (1963) reports the decision of the Comptroller General, Dees.
Comp. Gen. B-151269 (August 8, 1963), as follows:
But the continued refusal to award contracts to a company on the basis of non-
responsibility (following an initial determination thereof) results in indefinitely
depriving the company of contracts without the right of defense. For this
reason, debarment proceedings ... should be begun as soon as practicable after
the nonresponsibility determination. . . Accordingly, until GSA issues to X
a notice of intent to debar [thereby starting debarment proceedings], X must—
in the absence of evidence of nonresponsibility other than the criminal con-
viction on which the initial determination was based—be considered a responsible
bidder.
21 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. ¢§ 1001-1011 (1958).
2 2
 The hard question of "standing to sue" in government contract litigation
accounts for the paucity of decided cases in this field. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113 (1940). The decision in Copper Plumbing, supra note 14, expressly holditig
that a contractor debarred by the Department of Labor (on recommendation of the
Department of the Army) had standing to challenge in court the government's action
may be a breakthrough. The court distinguished the Lukens Steel case as a govern-
ment action not directed specifically at a contractor but at an industry. Previously, in
Schlesinger v. Gates, supra note 14, the same court had avoided the question by "assum-
ing without deciding" the issue of• standing to sue.
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and agencies had been submitted in writing, as well as the views of a
special subcommittee of the Public Contracts Committee, Administra-
tive Law Section, American Bar Association, the recommendations
were somewhat (but not much) modified by the Committee on Ad-
judication of Claims in its Report dated October I, 1962, and in that
form were adopted by the Administrative Conference after public
debate.
Considering the far-reaching nature of the recommendations,
impinging as they did upon a province long untouched and jealously
guarded by career procurement officials who naturally had come to
believe that their experience and their knowledge of contractors had
given them the expertise to make, without elaborate procedural pro-
ceedings, debarment decisions for the protection of what they con-
sidered to be the government's interest, the surprising development was
not that there was vigorous opposition, but that a number of govern-
ment agencies agreed (in principle, at least) with all or almost all of
the recommendations; or at least they did not object to them. Several
agencies agreed with some recommendations and questioned others.
A few agencies objected to any basic change in existing procedures,
apparently on the view that government contracting is merely a privi-
lege and that the recommended procedures would be burdensome and
might impair the exclusion •of the dishonest, irresponsible or untrust-
worthy from government contracting. But, as the Committee said, and
its position was adopted by the Administrative Conference: "The
Committee is persuaded, however, that whatever substance these
views may have, they are outweighed by the benefits to fair govern-
mental administration which would flow from adoption and imple-
mentation of the Committee's recommendations."
The most controversial recommendation was that opportunity for
a trial-type adversary hearing, essentially of the type required by
section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, should be required
before a contractor can be debarred or suspended, except, as set forth
below, in cases of criminal or civil adjudication affecting a contractor's
present responsibility, or probable cause for belief of a contractor's
fraud or other lack of present responsibility. This means that before
debarment can take place, there must be notice of proposed debarment
to the parties in question, including all affiliates sought to be de-
barred; notices must be supported by reasons, and a party contesting
the proposed action must be afforded the opportunity to have a trial-
type hearing before an impartial agency board or hearing examiner?
23 In his comments to Mr. Vance, Mr. Louis Spector, Chairman of the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, stated on July 9, 1962 that "it would be appro-
priate to assign such matters (debarment and suspension] to a single agency or board
in the interest of efficiency and fairness." In discussing his concurrence in the staff
recommendations, Mr. Spector made the following observations:
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In virtually any other field of administrative action this recom-
mendation would seem only to be a statement of what the law is or
ought to be. Indeed, the Committee Report24
 suggests that there are
"serious doubts" as to whether a trial-type hearing is not required in
contested debarment cases, as a matter of procedural due process.
Yet, the recommendation was bitterly opposed by a number of im-
portant procurement agencies 25
 as burdensome, unnecessary, dangerous,
etc. It was vigorously argued by some agencies that experience shows
that, in practice, most contractors do not actually contest the facts on
which debarment is based. The answer would appear to be that this
may well be the case (assuming the contractor knows that he is de-
barred and knows the reasons), but all that is required here is the
opportunity to request a hearing, and if the protesting agencies are
correct, there will be few such hearings.
The recommendation for a trial-type hearing was adopted by the
Conference, including the requirement that disputed material facts
should be quasi-judicially decided by an independent agency board or
hearing examiner on a record made in an adversary hearing.
The perplexing problem of what to do initially in the situation of
a contractor suspected—but not adjudicated—of fraud or other con-
duct showing lack of present suitability for government contracting,
which agitated some of the agencies, was the prime exception men-
tioned above to a trial-type hearing requirement. Here it seems ob-
vious that the government has a right to protect itself, for a reasonable
time, against having to deal with such a person or firm until the facts
are determined. Further, it is argued that the government should have
The concepts of due process and equal treatment run deep in our society and
have, for example, helped shape the charter and rules governing the pro-
cedures before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Continuing the
parallel with the "Disputes" procedures of the ASBCA, we quasi-judicially ad-
minister the appeals which come before us by determining the facts and apply-
ing thereto the contract terms and the law. These debarment proceedings
similarly involve determining the facts, and applying thereto the regulations,
representing the policy, and the law. Yet in the type of case covered in the
staff report, a mere accusation or charge is alone sufficient to visit upon the
contractor the penalties associated with guilt. The rights involved, that is,
entitlement to a contract, are at least substantial as those involved in determining
disputes under a contract already in being. Although it has been stated that
no one is entitled to a Government contract, it would appear that certain rights
vest in a party who, but for debarment, would have had a right to the contract
under existing laws and regulations.
The authors agree completely with Mr. Spector's analysis. They suggest that such
boards as the ASBCA, the Corps of Engineers Contract Appeals Board, the Interior
Board of Contract Appeals, and the Veterans Administration Board of Contract Appeals
would be singularly fitted to handle debarment and suspension proceedings on a
government wide basis.
24 The Committee Report relies on Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)
and cites Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1956).
25
 Agencies which filed no objection to a trial-type hearing included: AEC, GSA,
NASA, Department of Agriculture, HEW, Department of the Navy and SBA.
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the right to protect its trial evidence for a reasonable period. In
practice, as we have seen, the contractor has been summarily sus-
pended, often without notice or notification of grounds or opportunity
to show that the alleged facts are incorrect, pending governmental
determination whether to institute criminal or civil action. Frequently
the contractor has remained in a limbo for years, with the govern-
ment not having decided whether the facts did or did not justify
institution of an action, or perhaps having simply forgotten the mat-
ter. (Of course a criminal conviction or civil judgment, in matters
affecting a contractor's present responsibility, would be ground, with-
out more, for a suspension, pending administrative determination of
a debarment proper.) The Report adopted the device of giving the
government a period of one year, following a notice of suspension on
the grounds outlined above, within which to obtain a criminal charge
by indictment or information against the contractor or to file a civil
suit. If judicial proceedings are instituted within the one-year period,
the suspension may continue for the duration of any trial in a federal
court and for 120 days thereafter, within which period, if the de-
cision is against the contractor, debarment action should be completed.
But if no such judicial proceedings are instituted within the one-year
period, the suspension should automatically terminate, but without
prejudice to any right of debarment. The government could extend
the one-year suspension period to eighteen months—but not longer—
if the Attorney General or his designee (of at least the rank of an
Assistant Attorney General) should certify to the head of the sus-
pending agency that disclosure, for purpose of administrative debar-
ment, of the government's evidence would be substantially harmful to
the government's case or activities.
Where grounds other than alleged fraud or present lack of
integrity or honesty in government contract work are involved, the
original suspension period is not to exceed ninety days. Suspension
beyond ninety days should not be imposed except upon a written
determination, by an official of at least the rank of an Assistant
Secretary, stating the reasons and the necessity therefor. Three ad-
ditional suspension periods of up to ninety days could be imposed in
this manner, with the contractor being in each instance furnished a
copy of the determination, but in no event could the total suspension
period exceed one year.
Except as provided above, says the Committee, "the practice of
summary suspension of individuals and firms from Government con-
tracting without notice and opportunity for a trial-type hearing should
be discontinued."
It is apparent that the agency most directly concerned with this
recommendation is the government's litigation arm, the Department
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of Justice. It is important, then, to know that the Committee formu-
lated this recommendation only after detailed discussions with officials
of that Department, and that a letter from the Attorney General to
the Committee," stating the Department's views, recites that the
recommendation "will not hamper the investigation and prosecution
of criminal and civil frauds."
The Report would of course outlaw the secret blacklist, such as
the GSA "Review List of Bidders" (the very existence of which was
not to be disclosed to contractors) and the de facto blacklist, such
as the Navy "Contractor Experience List" (as to which the contractor
was at least told that it was proposed to put him on the list, and the
reasons therefor. He was also told that he might "furnish" the pertinent
facts.). Any government rejection of an otherwise successful bid,
solely or primarily on the ground that the bidder is believed to be
lacking in business honesty or integrity, should, said the Report, be
preceded by written explanation to the bidder, stating the reason for the
belief. The bidder should have the opportunity to reply within a reason-
able period consistent with the need for making an award in a timely
manner. In practice, the Report said, this would tend to channel such
government actions into the debarment or suspension procedures out-
lined earlier. This is where they belong. The distinction here is between
an "individual" rejection of a bid and true debarment. The Report con-
sidered, but found unacceptable, the protest of some agencies that
procurement would be unreasonably delayed, pointing out that no
particular form of hearing is required prior to bid rejection.
One recommendation to which there was no objection whatsoever
was that agency rules of procedure in all types of debarment should
be published, should be uniform to the extent practicable and should
provide for a fair and speedy determination. In its comments on this
recommendation the Report stated that agency rules, in dealing with
evidentiary and trial matters, should require that in a trial-type debar-
ment hearing the government has the burden of proof in the sense of
coming forward with a prima facie case.
The Report further recommended that any decision to debar a
contractor should be made in writing, should set forth findings, con-
clusions and reasons and should be furnished to the debarred person
or firm. The mere fact that such a recommendation should be neces-
sary, in this rather advanced age of administrative law, speaks
volumes concerning the present state of the practice of debarment. The
Report also urges, in an attempt to build up case law and policy in
this field, that such documented debarment decisions should in general
be published or be publicly available.
26 Printed as Appendix C to the Committee Report in Selected Reports of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, supra note 10.
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The indefensible failure of agency regulations to state grounds
for debarment, or to state them in specific and understandable terms
was naturally the subject of a major recommendation. The Report
said that all grounds for debarment should be explicitly set forth in
published agency regulations, and that "to the extent practicable and
desirable" agency regulations should be uniform. The grounds would
include, presumably as the major item, fraud incident to obtaining or
performing a government contract or subcontract or any other conduct
showing a serious and present lack of business integrity or business
honesty on government contracts, but would not be limited to those
matters. The vexing question of determining business affiliates, and
of imputing fraud or criminal conduct of an owner, officer or employee
to the firm to which he is connected, should, to the extent feasible, be
spelled out by standards and criteria in the regulations.
The final recommendation of the Report dealt with debarment
periods, a matter (it will be recalled) of considerable variance among
the federal agencies. The Report proposed that debarment periods
should be uniform, should be for a reasonable and definitely stated
period of time, commensurate with the seriousness of the cause, but
never to exceed three years, and that provision should be made for
removal of debarment within the period upon a showing of present
responsibility for government contract work."
The selection by the Report of a three-year maximum period in
all cases brought protests from several branches of the military, which
preferred the five-year period authorized by ASPR for some causes.
However, the Report found that five years was out of consonance with
the vast majority of agency practices and with Congressional policy as
implied by the three statutes bearing on the issue, and adhered to the
three-year maximum.
One agency, the Defense Supply Agency, argued for indefinite
debarment in "appropriate cases," coupled with a requirement that
the debarment be periodically reconsidered, but the proposal was found
unacceptable.
As to establishing procedures for removal of names from a de-
barment list, upon a showing of present responsibility, a few agencies
expressed concern over the possibility of undue administrative burdens
in dealing with claims having no substantial basis. However, the Report
took the position that a removal procedure is legally inherent in the
concept of listing, since if new facts develop which show that the
original judgment was incorrect when made or is without continuing
27 This would require not only the amendment of the ASPR, FPR and of the
regulations of the Secretary of Labor under Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950, but
also the amendment by the Congress of the now mandatory three-year debarment
period of the Buy American Act and of the Davis-Bacon Act.
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validity, there is probably no authority to continue the debarment.
Adequate protections could be set up to screen out insubstantial claims.
VI. FOLLOW-UP OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
After all written comments and objections from government
agencies had been received and considered by the Committee, and in-
corporated into the Committee Report summarized above, the Report
and its recommendations were publicly argued before the Council of
the Administrative Conference on October 17, 1962. Debate was
vigorous. Several of the findings and recommendations were attacked
by some agencies and defended by the Committee. In the end, the
Committee Report in its entirety was adopted by the Administra-
tive Conference. Together, with other subjects studied, it was sent to
the President on December 15, 1962, as part of the final Conference
Report.
By his letter of January 15, 1963, 28 President Kennedy thanked
the Conference for its "excellent" report and recommendations, stated
that the report contained many valuable suggestions for improving
administrative procedures, and said:
I have instructed the appropriate Government departments
to consider them and report to me upon the best method to
assure their implementation. I am confident that actions on
these recommendations will contribute materially to im-
proved administration of Federal regulatory programs.
And in a bulletin issued to all federal agencies and departments, the
Bureau of the Budget stated:
The President has requested the Bureau of the Budget to
follow up on recommendations made in the final report of
the Administrative Conference of the United States to assure
that actions to realize potential benefits are taken promptly.
This Bulletin requests each department or agency to submit a
report of agency views and the status of agency actions to
carry out the Conference recommendations. . .. Each agency
will evaluate the recommendations in terms of its own opera-
tions, keeping in mind the advantages to the public of Gov-
ernment-wide uniformity in policies and procedures when
such uniformity is consistent with effective discharge of the
agency's specific responsibilities. 29
28 S. Doc. No. 24, supra note 10 at IV.
28 Bureau of the Budget, Bulletin No. 63-10 (Feb. 27, 1963).
101
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
VII. ACTUAL RESULTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE STUDY
We recapitulate that the Administrative Conference made its
final report to the President on December 15, 1962; that the President
of the United States had endorsed that report and "instructed" the
government departments to consider and assure best methods of im-
plementation and that the Bureau of the Budget had followed up in
February, 1963 with a bulletin and that prior thereto the Attorney
General of the United States had stated that the recommendations
of the Staff Report "will not hamper the investigation and prose-
cution of criminal and civil frauds." What, then, has been the actual
result of the Administrative Conference study? At the time of this
writing (November 1963), some eleven months after the Conference
report and eight months after the agencies were requested to review
their debarment and suspension procedures, some progress can be re-
ported.
A. ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS
The Department of Defense has bowed to the recommendation for
a maximum three-year period of debarment. It has also adopted the
one-year period for suspension, extendable to a maximum of eighteen
months upon request by an Assistant Attorney General.
At the time of this writing, the pertinent ASPR revisions have not
been published. However, the writers have been assured that these
changes will be made in the ASPR. They will also include the Con-
ference recommendation for defining "affiliation."
But the Department of Defense has refused to accept the most
important Conference recommendation, the requirement of a trial-
type hearing. The individual military departments, which are bound
by the ASPR, could presumably adopt for themselves the trial-type
hearing concept, but at this time there is no indication that any of them
intend to do so.
B. FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS
With regard to the civilian departments and agencies, no changes
have yet been made in the FPR. The General Services Administration
has advised the writers that changes are in process to conform the
FPR to "certain of the Conference recommendations."
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